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DAVID M. LYNN* 
The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate 
Disclosure: Using the Securities Laws to Address 
Public Policy Issues 
I. Introduction 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(the “Dodd-Frank Act”)1 has been widely viewed as bringing about the most sweep-
ing changes to the financial regulatory system since the Great Depression.2  While 
the enormous legislative effort was clearly directed at reforms to financial services 
regulation,3 discrete provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act call for an unprecedented 
incursion into the public company reporting regime for the purpose of serving dis-
tinct public policy objectives, opening the door to the use of mandated public issuer 
disclosures as a means to directly or indirectly address specific policy interests that 
may not be at all material to the shareholders of those public companies.  This ar-
ticle explores the three provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) has described as “Specialized Corporate 
                                                                
© 2011 David M. Lynn 
 *  David M. Lynn is a partner of Morrison & Foerster LLP.  Mr. Lynn served as Chief Counsel of the Divi-
sion of Corporation Finance of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.   The views expressed in this 
article do not reflect the views of Mr. Lynn’s colleagues at Morrison & Foerster LLP or of the firm generally. 
 1. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) [hereinafter The Dodd-Frank Act].  
 2. Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 167, 234 (2011) (“On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act, the most sweeping fi-
nancial reform bill since Congress adopted secur ties regulations in response to the stock market crash of 
1929.”).  This comparison and description for The Dodd-Frank Act was first introduced in a speech by Presi-
dent Obama on July 21, 2009, stating, “So today, my administration is proposing a sweeping overhaul of the 
financial regulatory system, a transformation on a scale not seen since the reforms that followed the Great De-
pression.”  Barack Obama, The President of the United States of America, Remarks by the President on 21st 
Century Financial Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ 
press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform. 
 3. See The Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1376.  The preamble to the Dodd-Frank Act indicates the purpos-
es of the Act were “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bai-
louts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”  Id. 
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Disclosure,” which collectively include disclosure regarding mine safety,4 payments 
to governments by issuers engaged in resource extraction activities and the use by 
manufacturers of conflict minerals emanating from the Congo region of Africa,5 in-
cluding how these provisions are intended to operate, how the SEC proposed to 
implement the provisions and the potential implications for public issuers, inves-
tors and policymakers.6 
Title XV of the Dodd-Frank Act, aptly entitled “Miscellaneous Provisions,” con-
tains what the SEC has described as the “specialized” disclosure provisions (herei-
nafter collectively referred to as the “Specialized Corporate Disclosure” provisions).7 
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires persons to disclose annually whether 
any “conflict minerals” that are “necessary to the functionality or production” of a 
product of the person originated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an 
adjoining country and, if so, to provide a report describing, among other matters, 
the measures taken to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of 
those minerals.8 This must include an independent private sector audit of the report 
that is certified by the person filing the report.9  Section 1503 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
requires any reporting issuer that is an operator of a coal or other mine, or has a 
subsidiary that is a mine operator, to disclose in each periodic report filed with the 
SEC information related to health and safety violations, including the number of 
certain violations, orders, and citations received from the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (“MSHA”), among other matters contemplated in the statute.10  Is-
suers must also disclose in their Current Reports on Form 8-K the receipt from 
MSHA of any “imminent danger orders or notices indicating that a mine has a pat-
                                                                
 4. See infra Parts III.A–B. 
 5. See infra Parts IV.A–B. 
 6. See infra Parts V.A –B. 
 7. See The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 124 Stat. at 2212 (“Title XV – 
Miscellaneous Provisions”); see also U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, SPECIALIZED CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/speccorpdisclosure.shtml. 
 8.  Specialized Corporate Disclosure, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, available at http://www.sec.gov/ spot-
light/dodd-frank/speccorpdisclosure.shtml; See also The Dodd-Frank Act, § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2213–18 (discuss-
ing conflict minerals). 
 9. See The Dodd-Frank Act, § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2213–14. Persons are not required to comply with the 
rules adopted under Section 1502 until their first full fiscal year after the date on which the SEC issues final 
rules. Id. Section 1502(b) of the Dodd-Frank amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Ex-
change Act”), to add a new paragraph to Section 13, captioned “Disclosures Relating to Conflict Minerals Ori-
ginating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Id.; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 
111-257, § 13, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (as amended Oct. 5, 2010) available at http://www.sec.gov 
/about/laws/sea34.pdf.   
 10. Specialized Corporate Disclosure, supra note 8; see also The Dodd-Frank Act, § 1503, 124 Stat. at 2218–
20. (Section 1503 of the Dodd Frank Act entitled “Reporting Requirements Regarding Coal or Other Mine Safe-
ty.”). 
VOL. 6 NO. 2 2011 329 
tern or potential pattern of violating mandatory health or safety standards.”11  Sec-
tion 1504 of the Dodd-Frank requires reporting issuers engaged in the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals to disclose, in an annual report, certain 
payments made to the United States or a foreign government.12  The SEC must 
make a compilation of the electronically-provided information available online.13  
The Dodd-Frank Act established a very aggressive timetable for rulemaking un-
der the Specialized Corporate Disclosure provisions.14 The regulations required by 
Sections 1502 and 1504 must be adopted no later than 270 days after the Dodd-
Frank Act’s date of enactment.15 While no rulemaking was required under Section 
1503, the SEC proposed rules at the same time that it proposed the rules required 
by Sections 1502 and 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, and it is expected that the rules 
under Section 1503 would be adopted at the same time that rules are required to be 
adopted under Sections 1502 and 1504.16 
                                                                
 11. Specialized Corporate Disclosure, supra note 8; see also The Dodd-Frank Act, § 1504, 124 Stat. at 2219–
20.  Pursuant to Section 1503(f) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the disclosure requirements took effect 30 days after 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Id. at 2220. Section 1503(d) (2) specified that the SEC is “authorized to issue 
such rules or regulations as are necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors and to carry out the 
purposes of [Section 1503].”  Id. at 2219. Section 1503 of the Dodd-Frank Act did not amend the Exchange Act 
or any other provision of the pre-existing federal securities laws.  Id. at 2219–20. 
 12. Specialized Corporate Disclosure, supra note 8; The Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 2220–22.  Section 1504 
of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled “Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers.”  Id. at 2220. 
 13. Specialized Corporate Disclosure, supra note 8 (“Information must be provided in an interactive data 
format [to permit the SEC to compile the information electronically and provide the information online]. see 
also The Dodd-Frank Act, § 1504(q)(3), 124 Stat. at 2221–22 ( “To the extent practicable, the Commission shall 
make available online, to the public, a compilation of the information required to be submitted under the rules 
issued under paragraph (2)(A).”). 
 14. See Kathleen L. Casey, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Comm’n: The Regu-
latory Implementation and Implications of Dodd-Frank (Jan. 23, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://222.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012311klc.htm) (describing the timetable for implementing the 
Dodd-Frank Act, Commissioner Casey stated, “The timetables that the Act sets forth are in many cases extreme-
ly aggressive. . . .”).  The SEC also provides a timeline for the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act.  Imple-
menting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—Upcoming Activity, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. 
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/dfactivity-upcoming.shtml#0910 (stating that the SEC 
hopes to adopt  rules for Sections 1502, 1503 and 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act by August-December 2011). 
 15. See Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 229 
and 249) (SEC proposed rules implementing Section 1502 of the Dodd Frank Act); see also Disclosure of Pay-
ments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,978, 80,993 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. 229 and 249) (SEC proposed rules implementing Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 16. Specialized Corporate Disclosure, supra note 8. See also Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948 (proposed 
Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 229 and 249) (SEC proposed rules implementing Section 1502 of the 
Dodd Frank Act); Mine Safety Disclosure, 75 Fed. Reg. 80374 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. 229, 239, 249) (SEC proposed rules implementing Section 1503 of the Dodd-Frank Act.); Disclosure of 
Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,978, 80,993 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. 229 and 249) (SEC proposed rules implementing Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
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As discussed in this article, the new Specialized Corporate Disclosure provisions 
of the Dodd-Frank Act were borne out of discrete public policy concerns, rather 
than concerns that shareholders or potential investors in public issuers were being 
misled or kept in the dark about the level of involvement of public issuers in the use 
of conflict minerals, mine safety issues, or the payments to governments made by 
companies in extractive resource industries.17  As a result, these Specialized Corpo-
rate Disclosure provisions represent a historic shift away from the SEC’s mission to 
protect investors, maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
formation.18  The requirements for Specialized Corporate Disclosure are not based 
on the fundamental question of whether the information would be considered to be 
“material” by investors in making voting or investment decisions.19 Rather, the re-
quirements are based on a determination through the legislative process that the 
importance of the underlying public policy warrants the use of the public disclosure 
regime as a means for more broadly disseminating information that is of interest to 
certain members of the public, although not necessarily of interest to any investor.20 
It remains to be seen whether the Specialized Corporate Disclosure requirements 
represent a new trend toward special-interest driven, non-material disclosure re-
quirements for public issuers.21  In the meantime, public issuers across a wide varie-
                                                                
 17. See infra Parts II, III & IV. 
 18. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 6 (2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2010.pdf  
 19. The proposed releases implementing Sections 1502, 1503 and 1504 do not apply a “materiality” thre-
shold. See generally Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
229 and 249); Mine Safety Disclosure, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,374 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
229, 239, 249); Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,978, 80,993 (proposed 
Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 229 and 249).  Information is “material” for the purposes of the fed-
eral securities laws if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider the informa-
tion important in making a voting or investment decision.  TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439, 449 
(1976); see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (adopting the standard of materiality from the 
TSC Industries case). 
 20. See The Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 2213 (“It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade 
of conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict characte-
rized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and 
gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation therein, warranting the provi-
sions of section 13(p) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by subsection (b).”).   
 21. The SEC, shareholders and other interested parties have in the past sought to utilize the public disclo-
sure process as a means for communicating information relating to particular interest that does not necessarily 
constitute material information for a public company’s shareholders.  This trend has been noted by other prac-
ticing attorneys. See, e.g., Owen Bonheimer et. al.,  New Corporate Social Responsibility Mandate Related to 
Conflict Materials in the New Financial Reform Bill Could Affect Many Companies (2010), available at 
http://www.steptoe.com/publications-7050.html. (commenting on the same conflict minerals provision of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and stating, “the Brownback Amendment may have helped usher in a new era of corporate 
social responsibility mandates that w ll require companies to audit their supply chains as vigorously as they are 
required to audit their financials.”). 
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ty of industries will likely incur significant compliance costs in the development of 
the newly-required information, with potentially only marginal benefits to inves-
tors. 
II. Conflict Minerals Disclosure 
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to address (at least in part), through dis-
closure in SEC filings made by public companies that are subject to the require-
ments, the highly sensitive political controversy raised by ongoing armed conflict in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) and the adjoining region in 
Africa.22 Section 1502 was adopted to promote transparency and consumer aware-
ness regarding the use of certain minerals mined in the Congo and adjoining re-
gion23 that, in some cases, benefit the armed groups engaged in conflict in that re-
gion.24  It would appear that ultimately the objective may be to discourage the use of 
these minerals by manufacturing companies, principally by exposing the use of con-
flict minerals through the public disclosure process.25  It has not been suggested in 
any of the legislative history of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (or any preced-
ing legislative initiatives) that the conflict minerals disclosure provision is being 
adopted in accordance with the mission of the SEC to protect investors, maintain 
fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.26  
Notwithstanding the lack of any significant connection to the federal securities 
laws and to any established notions of materiality with regard to the required dis-
closures, nothing in this article should be construed as downplaying the severity of 
the humanitarian crisis in the Congo region.  The long-running conflict has re-
                                                                
 22. The Dodd-Frank Act, § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2213–18; see also Final Report of the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution (hereinafter 
“Final Report”)1896 (2009), transmitted by letter of the Chair of the Security Council Committee concerning 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2010/596/61506 (Nov. 29, 2010) (discussing the armed 
conflict and conflict mineral issues in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and surrounding territories). 
 23. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, in west-central Africa, is bordered by the Republic of Congo, 
the Central African Republic, the Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia and Angola. The re-
quirements of Section 1502 apply to this entire region, not solely the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  See 
Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,971 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 229 and 
249) (“The proposed rules would require clear disclosure about the source and chain of custody of an issuer’s 
necessary conflict minerals, which may result in increased transparency about the origin of those minerals.”). 
 24. See generally Final Report, supra note 22, at 47 (discussing the numerous financial benefits the groups 
involved in the armed conflict receive from the mining of mineral and other natural resources). 
 25. See The Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 2215 (noting that the objective of Section 1502 of the Dodd-
Frank Act is to discourage the use of conflict minerals by increasing disclosure requirements while also moni-
toring and stopping the commercial activities that contribute to the activities of armed groups and human 
rights violations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 
 26. See id. § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2213. 
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sulted in an extraordinary number of deaths and the significant displacement of the 
population.27 Against the backdrop of worldwide concern about the crisis in the 
Congo region, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act focuses on one of the commer-
cial aspects of the crisis, in particular the extent to which specific minerals that are 
mined in the region find their way into the sourcing and supply chain, and ulti-
mately into a wide range of products manufactured by public companies that are 
required to file reports with the SEC.28 
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act thus requires specified persons to disclose 
annually whether any “conflict minerals” that are “necessary to the functionality or 
production” of a product of the person originated in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo or an adjoining country and, if so, to provide a report describing, among 
other things, the measures taken to exercise due diligence on the source and chain 
of custody of those minerals, which must include an independent private sector au-
dit of the report that is certified by the person filing the report.29  In December 2010, 
the SEC proposed rules to implement the conflict minerals requirements.30   
A.  Disclosure Concerning Conflict Minerals and Their Use  
The term “conflict minerals” refers to “columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, 
gold, wolframite or their derivatives [,]” and “any other mineral or its derivatives 
determined by the Secretary of State [of the United States] to be financing [armed] 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.”31  These 
minerals are ubiquitous in many products manufactured across a number of indus-
tries, notably including the jewelry and electronics industries, and manufacturers 
who regularly utilize tin, gold, or tungsten in the manufacturing process.32 As the 
SEC noted in the Conflict Minerals Proposing Release,  
                                                                
 27. See Final Report, supra note 22, at 38.  Part V.B. of this report, entitled, “Individuals operating in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and committing serious violations of international law involving the target-
ing of children or women in situations of armed conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual violence, ab-
duction, and forced displacement” makes note of the substantial violence and displacement in the region. Id. at 
38–41. The report discusses the numerous financial benefits the groups involved in the armed conflict receive 
from the mining of mineral and other natural resources.  Id. at 47. 
 28. See generally The Dodd-Frank Act, § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2213. 
 29. Id. at 2213–14. 
 30. Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 229 and 
249) (“The proposed rules would require clear disclosure about the source and chain of custody of an issuer’s 
necessary conflict minerals, which may result in increased transparency about the origin of those minerals.”).  
The comment period was extended to March 2, 2011. See Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,110 (proposed Feb. 
3, 2011) (proposed rule comment period extension) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 229 and 249). 
 31. The Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 2218. 
 32. Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,950 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 229 
and 249) (describing the uses of the various minerals discussed). 
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“cassiterite is the metal ore . . . commonly used to produce tin, which is used 
in alloys, tin plating, and solders for joining pipes and electronic circuits. . . .
 
Columbite-tantalite is the metal ore from which tantalum is extracted; tan-
talum is used in electronic components, including mobile telephones, com-
puters, videogame consoles, and digital cameras, and as an alloy for making 
carbide tools and jet engine components.”33 
  
Gold is of course used for making jewelry, and is also used in a wide range of elec-
tronic, communications, and aerospace equipment.34 Lastly, wolframite is used to 
produce tungsten, which is used for “metal wires, electrodes, and contacts in light-
ing, electronic, electrical, heating, and welding applications.”35  Given the wide 
range of uses for these conflict minerals, the SEC expects that the conflict minerals 
disclosure requirements will apply to many different companies across a wide array 
of industries.36  
In accordance with Section 1502, the conflict minerals disclosure provision only 
applies to a “person described,” defined as one for whom conflict minerals are “ne-
cessary to the functionality or production of a product manufactured by such per-
son.”37  Under the SEC’s proposed rules, an issuer meeting this definition would be 
required to disclose, based on a reasonable country of origin inquiry, in the body of 
its annual report, whether its conflict minerals originated in the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo countries.38  Further, the SEC’s proposed rules would specify that if 
an issuer concludes that its conflict minerals did not originate in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo countries, then the issuer would be required to “disclose this 
determination and the reasonable country of origin inquiry process” that was used 
in making that determination in the body of its annual report.39 In addition, such an 
issuer would be required to: “(1) provide on its Internet website [the] determina-
tion that its conflict minerals did not originate in the [Democratic Republic of the 
Congo] countries; (2) disclose that this information is available on the [issuer’s] 
website and the Internet address of that site in the body of its annual report; and” 
(3) maintain records demonstrating that its conflict minerals did not originate in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo countries.40  
                                                                
 33. Id. (describing the industrial uses of Columbite-tantalite). 
 34. Id. (describing the industrial uses of gold). 
 35. Id. (describing the industrial uses of wolfamite). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 80,948. 
 39. Id. at 80,949. 
 40. Id.  
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By contrast, under the SEC’s proposed rules,  
“if an issuer concludes that its conflict minerals did originate in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo countries, or the issuer is unable to conclude 
that its conflict minerals did not originate in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo countries, then the issuer would similarly disclose [this] conclusion 
in its annual report.”41  
It is worth noting that the SEC’s proposed rules also require that a more compre-
hensive Conflict Minerals Report (discussed below) is furnished as an exhibit to the 
annual report, posted the Conflict Minerals Report on its Internet website, and that 
the issuer disclose that the Conflict Minerals Report is posted on the issuer’s Inter-
net website, and that the issuer provide the Internet address of that website.42  
The SEC’s proposed rules would require an issuer that has concluded that its 
conflict minerals did originate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo countries 
(or an issuer that is unable to conclude that its conflict minerals did not originate in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo countries) to provide, in a Conflict Minerals 
Report, a description of the measures that the issuer has taken to exercise due dili-
gence on the source and chain of custody of its conflict minerals.43  
“This would have to include a certified, independent, private sector audit of 
the Conflict Minerals Report that identifies the auditor and is furnished as 
part of the Conflict Minerals Report. Further, the issuer would be required 
to include in the Conflict Minerals Report a description of its products 
manufactured or contracted to be manufactured containing conflict miner-
als that are not ‘DRC conflict free,’ the facilities used to process those conflict 
minerals, those conflict minerals’ country of origin, and the efforts to deter-
mine the mine or location of origin with the greatest possible specificity.”44  
With respect to all of the determinations made in the Conflict Minerals Report, the 
issuer would have to exercise due diligence in making those determinations.45  
                                                                
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 80,949–50. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,949–50. 
 45. Id. at 80,950. 
VOL. 6 NO. 2 2011 335 
B. The Challenges Faced in Implementing the Conflict Minerals Disclosure 
Requirements 
As is the case with much of the Dodd-Frank Act rulemaking that the SEC presently 
grapples with, the language of Section 1502 is prescriptive and does not provide the 
SEC with much leeway for adopting workable implementing rules.46 For instance, 
Section 1502 does not provide for a de minimis standard regarding the amount of 
conflict minerals that an issuer must use in order to be subject to the above-
referenced reporting requirements.47 As a result, issuers using a very small amount 
of conflict minerals must nonetheless go through the disclosure exercise if that 
small amount “is necessary to the functionality or production of a product manu-
factured” (or contracted to be manufactured).48 In its proposed rules, the SEC has 
not proposed any de minimis standard, citing the absence of such flexibility in Sec-
tion 1502 itself.49 Moreover, in its proposed rules, the SEC has chosen to not specifi-
cally define some of the key terms that are used in Section 1502, such as “necessary 
to the functionality or production of a product manufactured by such person” or 
what is contemplated by the terms “manufacture” or “contracted to be manufac-
tured.”50 
The breadth of the due diligence and reporting requirements contemplated by 
Section 1502 and the SEC’s implementing rules will likely lead to very significant 
compliance costs for issuers in a wide variety of circumstances.51 While it is possible 
that more fully developed information and due diligence processes will be created 
regarding the raw materials supply chain and the sourcing of conflict minerals, issu-
ers will still be compelled by the rules to determine whether they are in fact engaged 
                                                                
 46. See The Dodd-Frank Act § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2213–18 (laying out detailed disclosure requirements). 
 47. See id.; see also Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,963 (“Materiality Threshold”) (proposed Dec. 15, 
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 249). 
 48. See The Dodd-Frank Act § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2214 (noting a person is required to file reports with the 
SEC if conflict minerals are necessary to the functionality or production of a product manufactured by such 
person, without mention of quantity); see also Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,963. 
 49. Id. at 80,963. The SEC sought comment as to whether a de minimis threshold amount of conflict mate-
rials should be incorporated into ts rules and, if so, what amount. The SEC also asked whether such a threshold 
would be consistent with Conflict Minerals Provision of Dodd-Frank. Id. These comments were due to the SEC 
by March 2, 2011. Conflict Minerals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 6,110 (proposed January 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 229, 249). 
 50. See id. at 80,950–52. 
 51. See Jessica Holzer, Corporate News: SEC Proposes ‘Conflict Mineral’ Report, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2010, at 
B9; see also Jessica Holzer, Retailers Fight to Escape ‘Conflict Minerals’ Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2010, at B1 (dis-
cussing the substantial burden compliance with the new conflict minerals disclosure requirements places on a 
broad array of U.S. companies). 
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in the manufacturing of products and the extent to which conflict minerals will po-
tentially be necessary to functionality or production of the issuer’s products.52  
All of this effort and expense will not be undertaken for the purposes of provid-
ing the company’s shareholders and prospective investors with information that is 
relevant to their voting or investment decisions.53 It could potentially be argued that 
the use of conflict minerals is qualitatively material from the standpoint of a rea-
sonable investor because of the potential impact on the sales and marketing of the 
company’s products once the use of conflict minerals is disclosed;54 however, this 
seems to be a circular argument given that, for the most part, the issuer would not 
have been required to perform due diligence on the supply chain and provide any 
disclosure regarding the use of conflict minerals absent Section 1502 of the Dodd-
Frank Act.55 
C. The Power of Disclosure & the Misguided Attempt to Have the SEC Address Public 
Policy through Disclosure 
The notion that public disclosure of the conduct of manufacturers in the sourcing 
of raw materials from mines in areas subject to conflict in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and adjoining countries will alter that conduct appears to be a funda-
mental tenet of Section 1502.56 In many ways, the provision is reflective of a notion 
arising from time to time in the legislative and regulatory arena that, when lacking 
any direct ability to regulate or control the activities of public issuers, indirect regu-
lation through the “shame” of public disclosure has the potential to accomplish the 
same objectives.57 
                                                                
 52. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1253 (1999) (noting the SEC considers information to be either “socially significant” or 
“economically significant[,]” but not both). 
 54. See id. at 1282–87 (arguing that social disclosure information may be material to economic decisions 
because it impacts how the company is marketed). 
 55. See Holzer, supra note 54, at B9; see also Holzer, supra note 54, at B1 (explaining that conflict minerals 
provisions of Dodd-Frank introduce many new disclosure requirements). 
 56. See The Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010) (describing extreme 
violence and emergency humanitarian situation in the region, various issuer disclosure and reporting require-
ments, and requirement that Secretary of State develop a strategy to address the linkages between human rights 
abuses, armed groups, mining of conflict materials, and commercial products). 
 57. See Mark Stephan, Environmental Information Disclosure Programs: They Work, but Why?, 83 SOC. SCI. 
Q. 190, 193–94 (2002) (discussing the link between information disclosure and pol tical and corporate beha-
vior); see also Holzer, supra note 54, at B9 (“The African-mineral rule aims to pressure companies to reject ‘con-
flict minerals’” who may be “shunned by consumers”); Holzer, supra note 54, at B1 (stating that the new law 
under Dodd-Frank “aims to pressure companies to spurn so-called conflict minerals” and “companies that fail 
to verify their mineral sources can still sell their products in the States, but could face public embarrassment”). 
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The United States economy remains decidedly “free market,” with notably few 
restrictions or direct regulation of business activities.58 There are, of course, excep-
tions, such as the regulation of the safety of products and services, the regulation of 
business conduct for national security purposes, the regulation of financial activities 
for the protection of consumers, investors and the overall financial system, the pre-
vention of fraud, and similar circumstances where the burden of regulation on 
commercial activities has been deemed necessary for some overriding public policy 
purpose.59 As a result of this approach, there remains no regulatory structure in the 
United States governing the conduct of business generally, including the conduct of 
business by larger companies that have accessed the public capital markets or that 
have a sufficient number of investors so that regulation of their disclosure by the 
SEC is mandated by statute.60 This leaves the SEC in the sometimes unenviable posi-
tion of serving as the only regulatory body that “touches” large businesses across all 
industries.61 Regardless of the business carried on by the public issuer, the result is 
that the SEC’s regulatory oversight becomes a likely mechanism for attempting to 
achieve policy objectives through the public disclosure process.62 
The SEC has not been, and likely never will be, a business conduct regulator (ex-
cept of course with respect to the regulated financial institutions and persons that 
the SEC regulates in its market oversight role, such as broker-dealers and ex-
                                                                
 58. See Alan Cowell & Edmund L. Andrews, European Converts to Laissez Faire See the Rush to Intervene as 
Heresy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at C1. 
 59. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (co-
dified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Ann Graham, The Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency: Love It or Hate It, U.S. Financial Regulation Needs It, 55 VILL. L. REV. 603, 605–07 (2010) (describing the 
Consumer Financial Protection Agency and analyzing recent financial reform and consumer protection legisla-
tion); Stephen Sothmann, Let He Who is Without Sin Cast the First Stone: Foreign Direct Investment and National 
Security Regulation in China, 19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 203, 223–25 (2009) (discussing instance of regula-
tion of foreign business investment for national security purposes). 
 60. See James Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public Company Management: Lessons from Bank Regula-
tion, 58 FLA. L. REV. 859 (2006) (discussing the lack of comprehensive corporate management regulation com-
pared to that of the banking industry); Charles R.P. Pouncy, The Rationale Rogue: Neoclassical Economic Ideolo-
gy in the Regulation of the Financial Professional, 26 VT. L. REV. 263, 310–11 (2002) (noting that there is no 
overriding regulatory system for the conduct of business actors). 
 61. See Fanto, supra note 63, at 861 (discussing the difficulties inherent in the SEC’s monitoring of large 
businesses across a diverse group of industries). 
 62. See generally Williams, supra note 56 (demonstrating that the SEC has statutory authority to enact dis-
closure requirements that promote the public interest or protect investors); see also Sandeep Gopalan, Shame 
Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 757 (2007) (examining the SEC’s policy of using public 
disclosure requirements to shame CEOs into taking less pay); Sandeep Gopalan, Alternative Sanctions and Social 
Norms in International Law: The Case of Abu Ghraib, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 785, 786–87 (2007) (proposing that 
shame can function as a powerful international force for achieving policy change). 
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changes).63 Rather, with respect to public issuers, the regulatory beat is principally 
limited to ensuring that material information is disclosed to shareholders and pros-
pective investors, so that they can make informed voting and investment decisions 
over time.64 It has been no secret, however, that the disclosure process, and the mar-
ket’s utilization of SEC-mandated disclosures, can have collateral effects on the ac-
tual conduct of a public issuer’s business.65 Thus, considerations about the reaction 
from the market and/or the reaction from the general public to disclosures can 
work to significantly influence the business decisions that an issuer’s board of direc-
tors and management will make.66 It is in this gray area that policymakers hope the 
mandated conflict mineral disclosures will operate to impact corporate behavior. 
Therefore, the means by which Section 1502 could successfully address the geo-
political concern of the “[e]xploitation and trade of [c]onflict [m]inerals 
[o]riginating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”67 is not directly through the 
additional due diligence and disclosure requirements contemplated by the statute 
and the implementing rules.68 It appears unlikely (although not entirely out of the 
question) that the requirements of Section 1502 will compel any sort of shareholder 
or investor backlash against public issuers that disclose the use of conflict minerals 
emanating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and adjoining countries.69 
Rather, in all likelihood, the principal consequence of the new disclosures will be to 
focus public attention on those issuers in the consumer electronics, jewelry, and 
other affected industries that source any conflict minerals from the Democratic Re-
                                                                
 63. The Exchange Act requires brokers and dealers to register with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (2006). 
Once registered with the SEC, brokers and dealers are subject to SEC authority over certain aspects of their 
business, including the supervision of personnel, financial responsibility, and the maintenance of corporate 
books and records. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (2006). The Act defines “broker” as “any person engaged in the business 
of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(4)(A) (2006). The Act defines 
“dealer” as “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for such person’s own account 
through a broker or otherwise” but excluded a bank or any person insofar as he “buys or sells securities for [his] 
own account, either individually or in [some] fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a regular business.” 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(5)(A), (B) (2006). Securities firms typically operate as both brokers and dealers and are, therefore, 
referred to as “broker-dealers.” 
 64. See Williams, supra note 56, at 1237, 1251–53; David Johnston, 10-K’s: A Good Read for the Curious 
Investor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at 3:12; see also Michael C. Schouten, The Mechanisms of Voting Efficiency 14 
(Ctr. for Bus. Res., Working Paper No. 411, 2010) (noting that informed shareholder voting and investment 
decisions require access to material information and ability to process that information). 
 65. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 56, at 1285–86 (discussing the impact of global social and environmental 
practices on consumer practices and corporate profitability, including famous examples of Nike and Walmart). 
 66. See supra notes 60, 65 and 68. 
 67. Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63547, 75 Fed. Reg. 246, 80,949 (proposed Dec. 15, 
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229, 249). 
 68. See supra notes 60, 65 and 68. 
 69. See Williams, supra note 56, at 1285–86. 
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public of the Congo and the adjoining countries.70 Such public attention would no 
doubt be facilitated through the efforts of those organizations that have been seek-
ing to draw public attention to the use of conflict minerals to finance the conflict in 
those areas, including the brutal nature of the conflict and the humanitarian crisis 
that has resulted.71 As a result, it seems the sheer shame of being a direct or indirect 
participant in the conflict and its financing is the ultimate disclosure objective, an 
objective far afield from the traditional role of the SEC and the public disclosure 
system.72 
An important question remains as to where the line might ultimately be drawn 
regarding the use of the public disclosure system contemplated by the federal secur-
ities laws for the purposes of addressing social, public policy, and geo-political con-
cerns.73 While acknowledging the seriousness and severity of the crisis on the Afri-
can continent represented by the conflict in the Congo region, there are many 
analogous circumstances in the United States and around the world where the role 
of public issuers in the normal course of commerce could be singled out for the 
purposes of creating a public spectacle of those issuers.74 Any such future attempts 
to utilize the public disclosure process for achieving ends other than to protect in-
vestors, to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and to facilitate capital for-
mation could risk overburdening both issuers and investors with costly disclosure 
requirements for information that is not material to any investment or voting deci-
sion.75 
III. Mine Safety Disclosure 
Section 1503 of the Dodd-Frank Act established new disclosure requirements for 
issuers that are operators, or that have a subsidiary that is an operator, of a coal or 
                                                                
 70. See, e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L USA, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/congo-dem-rep-of/page.do?id=1011136 (last visited Mar. 13, 2011) 
(describing the organization’s efforts to bring attention to the humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and to address the problem by reducing trade in conflict minerals). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See supra notes 60 and 65; see also Ian Talley, SEC Is Asked to Rethink CO2 Guidance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
24, 2010 (discussing SEC’s response to pressure from activist groups and investors regarding climate-change 
rules and corporate disclosure requirements); Kara Scannell, SEC Discord Count Stymie Schapiro’s Efforts, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 6, 2010, at B1 (noting political accusations that the SEC focused on the agenda of the social and envi-
ronmental policy lobby). 
 73. See supra note 65. 
 74. See, e.g., John M. Broder & Michael Luo, Well-Known Problems of Drilling Agency Still Avoided Fixes, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2010, at A13 (discussing previous corruption in an agency that regulates offshore drilling). 
 75. See supra Part II.B. 
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other mine.76 Under Section 1503, issuers operating coal or other mines must in-
clude disclosures regarding health and safety violations in periodic reports, and 
must file a Current Report on Form 8-K to disclose receipt of certain notices or or-
ders of mine safety violations, or a pattern of such violations.77 The disclosures re-
quired regarding coal or other mine safety were effective 30 days following enact-
ment of the Dodd-Frank Act.78 In December 2010, the SEC proposed rules regard-
regarding these provisions.79  
The disclosure requirements in Section 1503 refer to, and are based on, the 
health and safety requirements applicable to mines under the Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Act of 1977(“Mine Act”),80 which is administered by the MSHA.81 For 
the purposes of Section 1503, a “mine” is generally deemed to include “area[s] of 
land from which minerals are extracted in non-liquid form, or if in liquid form, are 
extracted with workers underground.”82 
Mine safety has been of area of significant public concern, as highlighted in re-
cent years by major mine accidents.83 In the spring of 2010, during the deliberation 
of the legislative initiatives that ultimately resulted in the Dodd-Frank Act, mine 
safety was a topic of close public attention following the explosion of the Upper Big 
Branch mine in West Virginia in April, in which all of the miners were killed.84 In 
the wake of this disaster, Section 1503 significantly expanded the level of detailed 
information about mine safety issues that must be publicly disclosed by public issu-
ers.85 
                                                                
 76. The Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 1503, 123 Stat. 1376, 2218 (2010). 
 77. Id. at 2218–19. 
 78. Id. at 2200. 
 79. Mine Safety Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9,164, Exchange Act Release No. 63,548, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 245, 80,374 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010). The SEC extended the comment period on the proposed rules to 
March 2, 2011. Mine Safety Disclosure,  76 Fed. Reg. 23, 6,110 (proposed February 3, 2010) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 229, 239, 249). 
 80. 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2006). 
 81. Mine Safety Disclosure, 75 Fed. Reg. 245, 80,374–75 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010)  (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 229, 239, 249). 
 82. See id. at 80,376 n. 28. 
 83. See, e.g., Ian Urbina, No Survivors Found After West Virginia Mine Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, 
at A1 (detailing fatal explosions in Appalachian mines). 
 84. See id. 
 85. The Dodd-Frank Act expands the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977’s reporting provisions. 
Compare Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1503, 123 Stat. 1376 (2010) with 30 U.S.C. § 811 et seq. (2006). 
VOL. 6 NO. 2 2011 341 
A.  Dodd-Frank’s Expanded Disclosure Requirements Concerning Mine Safety 
Section 1503 seeks to accomplish the disclosure objective via real-time reporting of 
mine safety violations through required disclosures made on the SEC’s Current Re-
port on Form 8-K, as well as periodic disclosures of data about mine safety viola-
tions to be included in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q and the Annual Report 
on Form 10-K.86 In contrast to the circumstances of public issuers that will be sub-
ject to the Section 1502 with regard to the use of certain “conflict minerals” in the 
manufacture of products, public issuers that operate mines are already subject to 
extensive regulation of the safety of their mine operations, as discussed above.87 
Therefore, the rationale for a significantly enhanced disclosure regime for mine 
safety violations (with many of such violations likely not to be deemed to be ma-
terial to prospective investors or shareholders) is less clear.88 Undoubtedly, there is a 
“shame” factor at work in compelling these disclosures, seeking to ultimately high-
light, through the descriptive current reports and the periodic data, those mine op-
erators with incidences of mine safety violations higher than those of their competi-
tors.89 
The current reporting requirements of Section 1503 require each issuer that is an 
operator, or that has a subsidiary that is an operator, of a coal or other mine to re-
port on Form 8-K the receipt of certain notices from MSHA, including: “(i) an im-
minent danger order under section 107(a) of the [Mine Act]; (ii) written notice 
from [MSHA]. . .  of a pattern of violations of mandatory health or safety standards 
that are of such nature as could have significantly and substantially contributed to 
the cause and effect of coal or other mine health or safety hazards under section 
104(e) of the [Mine Act];” or (iii) written notice from MSHA of the potential to 
have a pattern of such violations.90 
The periodic reporting requirements of Section 1503 have applied to any quar-
terly report on Form 10-Q or annual report on Form 10-K filed on or after August 
20, 2010.91 Such reports must include the following for each coal or other mine op-
erated by the issuer or its subsidiaries during the period covered:  
                                                                
 86. The Dodd-Frank Act, §1503, 124 Sta. at 2218–19. 
 87. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Ian Urbina & Bernie Becker, As Rescue Efforts Continue for Miners, Officials Press for Answers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, at A18 (noting that Congress had just recently overhauled the mining safety regulations in 
2006). But see Sheryl Stolberg, Reviewing Mine Safety, Obama Faults Company and the Government, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 16, 2010, at A15 (discussing how after the Upper Big Branch mine incident, President Obama referred to 
federal mining laws as “riddled with loopholes” that “allow unsafe conditions to continue”). 
 89. See Stephan, supra note 60, at 194. 
 90. The Dodd-Frank Act, § 1503, 124 Stat. at 2218–19. 
 91. Id. 
342 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW 
“(i) the total number of violations of mandatory health or safety standards 
that could significantly and substantially contribute to a mine safety or 
health hazard under Section 104 of the Mine Safety Act for which the mine 
operator received a citation from the MSHA; (ii) the total number of orders 
issued under Section 104(b) of the Mine Safety Act; (iii) the total number of 
citations and orders for unwarrantable failure of the mine operator to 
comply with mandatory health or safety standards under Section 104(d) of 
the Mine Safety Act; (iv) the total number of flagrant violations under Sec-
tion 110(b)(2) of the Mine Safety Act; (v) the total number of imminent 
danger orders issued under Section 107(a) of the Mine Safety Act; (vi) the 
total dollar value of proposed assessments from the MSHA under the Mine 
Safety Act; and (vii) the total number of mining-related fatalities.”92  
In addition an issuer’s periodic reports must include a list of coal or other mines 
operated by the issuer (or a subsidiary of the issuer) that receive written notice from 
the MSHA of either a pattern, or the potential to have a pattern, of violations of 
mandatory health or safety standards that are of such a nature as could have signifi-
cantly and substantially contributed to mine health or safety hazards under Section 
104(e) of the Mine Safety Act.93 Further, an issuer must disclose “[a]ny pending le-
gal action before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission involving 
such coal or other mine.”94 
Most of the information called for by these disclosure requirements is already 
publicly disclosed by MSHA and, as a result, is readily available to issuers, who re-
ceive the notices, orders and citations directly from MSHA and can also access rele-
vant information through MSHA’s data retrieval system.95 Further, the disclosure 
for periodic reports requiring disclosure of mining-related fatalities is already sub-
ject to MSHA regulations.96 
The SEC’s proposed rules under Section 1503 largely implement the statutory 
requirements that were already in effect following enactment of the Dodd-Frank 
                                                                
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 2219.   
 95. “MSHA maintains a data retrieval system on its website that allows users to examine data on inspec-
tions, violations, and accidents, as well as information about dust samplings, at specific mines throughout the 
United States.”  Mine Safety Disclosure, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,374, 80,375 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pt. 229, 239, 249).   The data retrieval system is available at http://www.msha.gov/drs/drshomt.htm. 
Id. at 80,378 n.50. 
 96. See 30 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2010) (requiring operators to immediately notify MSHA when there is a fatality 
at the mine); id. § 50.20 (2010) (requiring operators to prepare and submit a MSHA Report Form when there is 
an accident or injury at the mine). 
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Act.97 The proposed rules seek to implement and specify the scope and the applica-
tion of the Section 1503 disclosure requirements, as well as require some additional 
disclosure to provide context for certain items required by the Section 1503.98  The 
proposed rules would apply to both U.S. companies and to foreign private issuers, 
requiring disclosure in each Form 10-K, Form 10-Q, Form 20-F and Form 40-F 
filed with the SEC, as applicable.99  In addition to the disclosures required by Section 
1503, the proposed rules require that issuers describe the categories of violations, 
orders and citations they are reporting, so that the information provided in the re-
ports can be understood without referencing the Mine Act and MSHA rules.100  
With respect to the current reporting obligations under Section 1503, the pro-
posed rules would require that an issuer’s Form 8-K filing specify the type of order 
or notice, the date of the order or notice, and the name and location of the mine 
involved.101  The SEC has proposed to add new Item 1.04 to Form 8-K, “which 
would require filing of Form 8-K within four business days of the receipt by an issu-
er (or a subsidiary of the issuer) of” the notices or orders discussed above.102  Under 
the SEC’s proposed rules, a late filing of the Form 8-K would not affect an issuer’s 
eligibility to use a Form S-3 short-form registration statement.103  Foreign private 
issuers would not be required to file current reports under the SEC’s proposed 
rules.104  
B. The Challenges of Providing Mine Safety Disclosure 
In contrast to the significant undertaking required to comply with Section 1502 
with regard to disclosure of the use of conflict minerals, the mine safety disclosure 
requirements contemplated by Section 1503 largely build upon reporting systems 
that are already in place under the Mine Act and through MSHA.105  Thus, Section 
1503 was targeted at bringing mine safety issues to the public reporting system as a 
means of essentially raising the profile of the violations that occur and highlighting 
                                                                
 97. Mine Safety Disclosure, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,374, 80,375 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 229, 239, 249).  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 80,375–76. 
 100. Id. at 80,378, 80,380–81.  
 101. Id. at 80,380. 
 102. Id. at 80,381. 
 103. Id. at 80,375, 80,382. 
 104. Id. at 80,381. 
 105. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 50.10 & 50.20 (2010). 
344 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW 
the incidences (through both current reporting and statistical data) of mine safety 
violations to facilitate comparisons across public issuers that operate mines.106 
The judgments made as to the information required for issuers to disclose re-
garding mine safety issues do not appear to have been based on assessments of ma-
teriality of that information.  For example, some of the mine safety violations indi-
vidually reported on Form 8-K following enactment of Section 1503 do not appear 
to be material in any way to understanding the issuer’s mining operations or the 
risk profile of those mining operations.  As a result, issuers have felt compelled to 
explain in the context of these disclosures that problems were corrected or that 
there was no adverse impact on the operations as a result of the order or notice.107 
The mine safety disclosure requirements under Section 1503 and as proposed to 
be implemented by the SEC’s rules, potentially create another danger in the context 
of using the public disclosure system for the purposes of achieving objectives out-
side of the SEC’s core mission.  The frequency with which issuers must report no-
tices and orders on Form 8-K, and the duplicative nature of the disclosure provided 
in the periodic reports regarding the mine safety violations,108 risk the problem of 
over-emphasis of these matters in the public reporting for affected issuers.  The na-
ture of the MSHA regulatory process and the types of events which trigger Form 8-
K disclosure result in the need for frequent filings by issuers, requiring prospective 
investors and shareholders of those issuers to wade through a significant volume of 
filings in order to locate information that may in fact be material to an investment 
                                                                
 106. See S. 3886, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted as The Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 123 Stat. 1376 
(2010)) (stating that the purpose of the statute was “[t]o require publicly traded coal companies to include cer-
tain safety records in their reports to the Commission”); Press Release, Senator John D. “Jay” Rockefeller IV, 
Rockefeller Requires Mining Companies to Disclose Safety Records (May 7, 2010), available at 
http://rockefeller.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=324768& (discussing Senator Rockefeller’s reasons for intro-
ducing the amendment that would require mining companies to disclose safety records). 
 107. See, e.g., Massey Energy Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 26, 2010) (“The Company is currently 
evaluating the situation and will take steps to correct any unfavorable conditions and ensure the safety of its 
miners. No injuries resulted from the condition described in the order”). 
 108. The SEC states in the Mine Safety Disclosure Release:  
[w]e believe the plain language of Section 1503 of the Act requires such orders and notices to be re-
ported both in issuers’ Forms 8-K and their periodic reports. For example, if an issuer receives from 
MSHA one of the orders or notices specified above during the second quarter of the year, the issuer 
would file a Form 8-K reporting the receipt of the order or notice within four business days of re-
ceipt, include information about such order or notice in accordance with new Regulation S-K Item 
106 in its Form 10-Q for the second quarter and include information regarding this violation in the 
annual cumulative total for the fiscal year in its Form 10-K for that fiscal year. 
Mine Safety Disclosure, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,374, 80,381 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
228–30, 239, 240, 249).  
VOL. 6 NO. 2 2011 345 
decision.109  In this regard, the SEC has in the past reserved the Current on Form 8-
K for the reporting of triggering events that are deemed “unquestionably or pre-
sumptively material.”110  It is questionable whether the triggering events for the pro-
posed new Item 1.04 of Form 8-K would rise to this level of materiality, and the new 
requirement thus runs the risk of creating unnecessary “noise” in the public report-
ing for issuers operating mines.111 
IV. Payments to Governments by Certain Resource Extraction Issuers 
Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act imposes requirements on certain resource ex-
traction issuers to disclose, in their annual reports filed with the SEC, information 
regarding payments made by the issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer, or an entity under 
the control of the issuer, to either the U.S. Federal Government or to a foreign gov-
ernment for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural gas or min-
erals.112  Section 1504 was enacted against a backdrop of international efforts seeking 
to encourage greater transparency and accountability in countries dependent on the 
revenues from oil, gas and mining.113 
A.  Disclosure Concerning Payments to Governments by Certain Resource Extraction 
Issuers 
Section 1504 defines “commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals” to 
include the “exploration, extraction, processing, export, and other significant ac-
tions relating to oil, natural gas, or minerals, or the acquisition of a license for any 
such activity, as determined by the [SEC].”114 The payments covered by the disclo-
sure requirements under Section 1504 include “taxes, royalties, fees (including li-
                                                                
 109. See id. (“[W]e are proposing that the current report under new Item 1.04 be required to be filed no 
later than four business days after the triggering event. . . . [T]he triggering events . . . do not require manage-
ment to make rapid materiality judgments. . . .”). 
 110. Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594 
(proposed March 16, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 228–30, 239, 240, 249)(adopting additional disclo-
sure items for Form 8-K).   
 111. See supra note 93.  
 112. The Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1504(q)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 2220–21 (2010).  Section 1504 
is similar to the disclosure requirements in the proposed Energy Security Through Transparency Act (the 
“Transparency Act”), which was introduced in Congress in September 2009.  S. 1700, 111th Cong. (2009).  The 
Transparency Act sought to address a number of concerns including promoting good governance in extractive 
industries, promoting energy security, improving the transparency of revenue payments to governments, and 
increasing the public information ava lable to shareholders of public issuers.  Id. 
 113. See, e.g., Group of Eight [G8], Muskoka Declaration Recovery and New Beginnings, at 5 (June 25–26, 
2010) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/g8_muskoka_declaration.pdf (urging countries 
in the extractive sector to enhance governance and accountability). 
 114. The Dodd-Frank Act, § 1504(q)(1)(A), 123 Stat. at 2220. 
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cense fees), production entitlements, bonuses, and other material benefits, that the 
[SEC] . . . determines are part of the commonly recognized revenue stream for the 
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.”115 In making this assess-
ment, Section 1504 indicates that the SEC must consider, to the extent practicable, 
the guidelines set out by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(“EITI”).116  EITI is an international organization with the stated purpose of pro-
moting transparency and improved governance in the oil, gas and mining indus-
tries.117 The required disclosures under Section 1504 include “the type and total 
amount of such payments made for each project . . . relating to the commercial de-
velopment of oil, natural gas, or minerals[and] the type and total amount of such 
payments made to each government.”118  Section 1504 provides that a payment that 
is of a de minimis amount will not require disclosure.119  The disclosures required 
under Section 1504 must be made in the issuer’s annual report, and must be sub-
mitted to the SEC in an interactive data format.120  
More specifically, Section 1504 requires that the interactive data submitted to the 
SEC to identify, for any payments made by a resource extraction issuer:  
(i) the total amounts of the payments, by category; (ii) the currency used to 
make the payments; (iii) the financial period in which the payments were 
made; (iv) the business segment of the . . . issuer that made the payments; 
(v) the government that received the payments, and the country in which 
the government is located; (vi) the project of the . . . issuer to which the 
payments relate; and (vii) [any] other information [that the SEC considers] 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors.121  
The disclosure requirements under Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act will take 
effect beginning with the annual report for the first fiscal year ending on or after the 
first anniversary of the date on which the SEC issues final rules implementing Sec-
                                                                
 115. The Dodd-Frank Act § 1504(q)(1)(C), 124 Stat. at 2220. 
 116. Id.§ 1504(q)(1)(C). 
 117. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, EITI Fact Sheet, http://eiti.org (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 118. The Dodd-Frank Act, § 1504(q)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 2221.  
 119. Id. at 2220. 
 120. Id. at 2221. 
 121. Id.  
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tion 1504.122  In December 2010, the SEC proposed rules regarding these provi-
sions.123 
Section 1504 provides that the SEC’s rules should, to the extent practicable, sup-
port the federal government’s commitment to “international transparency promo-
tion efforts relating to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or miner-
als.”124 In this regard, Section 1504 directs the SEC, to the extent practicable, to 
make publicly available online a compilation of the information required to be 
submitted pursuant to the disclosure requirements contemplated by Section 1504.125  
Under the SEC’s proposed rule and form amendments, an issuer would be re-
quired to provide the information mandated by Section 1504 about resource extrac-
tion payments in an exhibit filed in HTML or ASCII format, which would allow 
prospective investors and shareholders to read the disclosure about payment infor-
mation without the aid of additional computer programs or software.126 In addition, 
a resource extraction issuer would be required to file a second exhibit with the in-
formation about resource extraction payments electronically tagged in XBRL for-
mat, which would be readable through a viewer.127 The SEC’s proposed rule and 
form amendments would also require a resource extraction issuer to “provide a 
statement, under an appropriate heading in the issuer’s annual report, referring to 
the payment information provided in the exhibits to the report.”128 The Section 
1504 payment disclosure requirements would apply to U.S. and foreign resource 
extraction issuers as contemplated by the SEC’s proposed rules.129  A new Item 105 
to Regulation S-K proposed by the SEC would “require a resource extraction issuer 
to provide information relating to any payment made by it, a subsidiary, or an enti-
ty under its control to a foreign government or the U.S. Federal Government during 
the fiscal year covered by the annual report for the purpose of the commercial de-
velopment of oil, natural gas, or minerals.”130 
                                                                
 122. Id. § 1504(q)(2)(F). 
 123. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 63,549, 75 Fed. Reg. 
80,978, 80,978 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010). On January 28, 2011, the SEC extended the comment period on the 
proposed rules to March 2, 2011. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange Act No. 
63,795, 76 Fed. Reg. 6,111 (Feb. 3, 2011). 
 124. The Dodd-Frank Act § 1504(q)(2)(E), 124 Stat. at 2221. 
 125. Id. § 1504(q)(3)(A). 
 126. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 63,549, 75 Fed. Reg. 
80,978, 80,990 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 80,980. 
 130. Id. at 80,994. 
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B. The Challenges of Providing Government Payments Disclosure 
Section 1504 touches upon a sensitive area of disclosure for issuers engaged in the 
commercial development of oil, natural gas or minerals, as payments made to the 
U.S. government and to foreign governments can raise a variety of issues from a 
business, competitive and geo-political standpoint.131  While initiatives have been 
underway to date to increase transparency in this area, Section 1504 represents the 
mandated use of the existing public disclosure system as a means of addressing the 
issue.132  As with Section 1502, the disclosure under Section 1504 seems largely tar-
geted at eliciting information that has implications for public policy around the 
world. 
Of all of the Specialized Corporate Disclosure provisions, Section 1504 perhaps 
is a better “fit” with SEC reporting.  The payment information could be more easily 
determined to be material to an investor or shareholder, and the statute (as well as 
the SEC’s proposed rules) provide for a de minimis exception to the disclosure re-
quirement so as to avoid the unnecessary disclosure of information that is not ma-
terial.133  Section 1504 provides the SEC with the latitude to require additional dis-
closure of any other information that the SEC considers necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors, which is a standard that is 
more reflective of the typical consideration made by the SEC in adopting rules un-
der the federal securities laws.134 
The SEC has sought to in some ways to lessen the burden of the Section 1504 
disclosure requirements in its proposed rules, by requiring the payment and related 
information as exhibits to the annual report that, for the purposes of the securities 
laws, will be considered to be “furnished” rather than “filed.”135 As a result, the ex-
hibits to be filed by resource extraction issuers would not be subject to Section 18 
liability under the Exchange Act.136 However, failure to furnish the information 
would subject the resource extraction issuer to liability under Sections 13(a) and 
15(d) of the Exchange Act.137 
                                                                
 131. Id. at 80,997. 
 132. The Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1504, 123 Stat. 1376, 2220–20 (2010); see Press Release, Ex-
tractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Six More Countries Compliant with Transparency and Accounta-
bility Standard (Mar. 2, 2011), available at 
http://eiti.org/news-events/press-release-six-more-countries-compliant-transparency-and-accountability-
standard (discussing transparency initiative in oil, gas, and mining sectors).  
 133. See The Dodd-Frank Act, § 1504(q)(1)(C), 124 Stat. at 2220. 
 134. See id. § 1504(q)(2)(D). 
 135. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange Act No. 63,549, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,978, 
80,992 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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The utilization of interactive data for the submission of the information required 
by Section 1504 represents a relatively recent trend toward providing SEC-required 
information (such as the information included in financial statements) in a format 
that users can easily compile and manipulate.138  The availability of this data in an 
interactive format will not only facilitate the analysis of the information by prospec-
tive investors and shareholders of resource extraction issuers, but also permit inter-
ested groups and governments to compile the data in such a way that will provide 
further transparency and insight into the subject payments and related information. 
The provisions of Section 1504 and the SEC’s proposed rules also seek to avoid 
the potential problems discussed above with regard to Section 1503, in that no cur-
rent reporting of payments of resource extraction issuers will be required,139 limiting 
the release of the information to an annual event and through an exhibit filing, 
where the risk of over-emphasis of the information is reduced. 
V. Analogous Uses of the SEC Disclosure System for Policy Interests 
The Specialized Corporate Disclosure provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act do not 
represent the first time that the SEC’s public disclosure system has been utilized for 
serving policy interests that may extend beyond the specific concerns of prospective 
investors and shareholders under the federal securities laws.140  For example, the 
SEC has, in the recent past, engaged in significant efforts toward eliciting disclosure 
about matters affecting global security risks, and the shareholder proposal process 
                                                                
 138. Interactive data allows users to pinpoint facts and figures and immediately pull out this information to 
organize and compare with other data. See, e.g., What is Interactive Data and Who’s Using It?, 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/xbrl/what-is-idata.shtml (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). The SEC first began explor-
ing the use of interactive data in 2003 and “continues to investigate ways to further integrate interactive data 
into its disclosure system.” Id. 
 139. Instead, reports of payments made by the resource extraction issuer shall be made on an annual basis. 
See The Dodd-Frank Act, § 1504(q)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 2220. 
 140. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Enhanced Disclosure About Risk, 
Compensation and Corporate Governance (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press 
/2009/2009-268.htm (describing new rules to improve corporate disclosure of employee risk-taking, qualifica-
tions of directors, consideration of diversity, board structure and leadership); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and 
Related Matters (July 26, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm (discussing 
rules requiring disclosure of executive compensation for shareholders and boards to help determine pay of em-
ployees); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Disclosure Documents Indicate All Broker-Dealers and 
Non-Bank Transfer Agents Ready for Year 2000 (Nov. 19, 1999), available at http://edgar.sec.gov/news/press/ 
pressarchive/1999/99-155.txt (illustrating SEC’s use of Y2K compliance and disclosure to ensure broker-dealer 
commun ty ready for new millennium). 
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has been utilized for many years to compel disclosure regarding a wide array of pol-
icy considerations.141 
A. The SEC’s Office of Global Security Risk 
At the direction of Congress, the SEC established the Office of Global Security Risk 
within the Division of Corporation Finance.142 The Office of Global Security Risk 
was established to work with the staff in the Division of Corporation Finance that 
reviews reports filed by public issuers to determine if those issuers must include dis-
closure of material information regarding global security risk-related issues.143  
The SEC’s rules do not include specific mandated line items requiring a discus-
sion of global security risks, however, the Office of Global Security Risk seeks to re-
quire issuers to include information about global security risks when material to the 
issuer, based upon broader requirements such as under management’s discussion 
and analysis of results of operations and financial condition,144 the business descrip-
tion,145 and risk factors.146 
In 2004, the SEC was directed to establish the Office of Global Security Risk 
within the Division of Corporation Finance,147 with the duties of the new office to 
include: (i) establishing a process by which the SEC identifies all companies listed 
on U.S. stock exchanges that operate in State Department-designated “terrorist-
sponsoring states” (e.g., Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria);148 
                                                                
 141. One such disclosure initiative with regard to global security risks was a software tool on the SEC web-
site that allowed investors to obtain information directly from company disclosure documents about their busi-
ness interests in countries designated as “State Sponsors of Terrorism” by the U.S. Secretary of State. Press Re-
lease, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,, SEC Adds Software Tool for Investors Seeking Information on Companies’ 
Activities in Countries Known to Sponsor Terrorism (June 25, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2007/2007-121.htm; see infra notes 158–61 and accompanying text. 
 142. Office of Global Security Risk, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin /globals 
ecrisk.htm. 
 143. See id. In a May 2001 letter from S.E.C Chairman Laura Under to Congressman Frank Wolf, it was 
noted that “[t]he fact that a foreign company is doing material business with a country, government, or entity 
on [the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control] sanctions list is, in the SEC staff’s view, 
substantially likely to be significant to a reasonable investor’s decision about whether to invest in that compa-
ny.” Congressman Frank P. Wolf, SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 579, *6 (May 8, 2001). 
 144. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2010). 
 145. Id. § 229.101. 
 146. Id. § 229.305. 
 147. H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 151 (2003) (accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, in 
which Congress directed the SEC to establish the Office of Global Security Risk within the Division of Corpora-
tion Finance); see EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND 
DERIVATIVES MARKETS § 2.06[2][i] (9th ed. 2009).  
 148. H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 151 (2003). The U.S. Secretary of State has since removed Iraq, Libya, and 
North Korea from the roster of state sponsors of terrorism. See Iraq, Libya and North Korea Officially Removed 
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(ii) ensuring that such companies disclose these activities to investors;149 (iii) im-
plementing enhanced disclosure requirements based on the “asymmetric nature of 
the risk to corporate share value and reputation” stemming from business interests 
in these countries;150 (iv) coordinating with other federal government agencies to 
share relevant information;151 and (v) initiating a global dialogue to ensure U.S.-
traded foreign corporations properly disclose their activities in “terrorist-
sponsoring states” to U.S. investors.152 The SEC was also directed to provide quar-
terly reports on the activities of the Office of Global Security Risk.153 
At the time of this Congressional direction to establish the Office of Global Secu-
rity Risk, critics claimed that the directive would impose a political or foreign policy 
agenda on the SEC that was not consistent with the agency’s traditional role in 
overseeing disclosure of material information by public issuers.154  However, unlike 
the Specialized Corporate Disclosure provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that are not 
ostensibly based on traditional notions of materiality discussed above, the staff of 
the SEC has sought to implement its global security risk directive in a manner con-
sistent with the concept of materiality.155  In this regard, the description of the Office 
of Global Security Risk provided by the SEC states:  
[t]he Commission’s disclosure-based regulatory approach has served the in-
vesting public and this agency well over the years, and the standard for dis-
closure—that of materiality—has long been the foundation of the Commis-
sion’s work. We are committed to maintaining the materiality standard as 
the basis for our disclosure-based approach.156 
Moreover, unlike the prescriptive requirements of the Specialized Corporate 
Disclosure provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC has not adopted any specific 
                                                                                                                                                    
From Terrorist Roster, UMCI NEWS, May 19, 2009.  At the time of publication, the U.S. Dept. of State has desig-
nated Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria as “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEPT. OF 
STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).  
 149. H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 151.   
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See, e.g., Letter from Marc Lackritz, President, Sec. Indus. Ass’n, to William Donaldson, Chairman, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=831 (express-
ing concern that the creation of the Office “could be a first step towards politicizing the U.S. capital markets” 
and presented “troubling issues” w th the SEC’s traditional role of disclosure and materiality). 
 155. Office of Global Security Risk, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin 
/globalsecrisk.html. 
 156. Id. 
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rules calling for disclosure of global security risk considerations by public issuers.157  
Rather, the SEC’s staff has sought to require the disclosure where necessary through 
the process of reviewing and commenting on the filings made with the SEC by pub-
lic issuers.158 
B.  The Shareholder Proposal Process 
Rule 14a-8, a proxy rule adopted by the SEC, requires that public issuer include 
shareholder proposals in their proxy materials.159  The rule, first adopted in 1942, 
originally was intended to allow shareholders participating in an annual meeting by 
proxy to vote on matters to be proposed from the floor of the meeting.160  Under 
Rule 14a-8, a company must include a shareholder proposal in its proxy materials 
unless it violates one of the rule’s procedural requirements or one of thirteen subs-
tantive restrictions.161  Rule 14a-8 imposes several procedural requirements on 
shareholders who rely on the rule.162 A shareholder may only submit one proposal 
per meeting must own at least $2,000 or 1% of securities entitled to vote on its pro-
posal and must limit its proposal to 500 words.163  A shareholder must submit the 
proposal at least 120 days before the date of the company’s proxy statement for the 
previous year’s annual meeting (or a reasonable time before the company begins to 
print and mail its proxy materials if the company did not have an annual meeting 
                                                                
 157. See Mechanisms to Access Disclosures Relating to Business Activities in or with Countries Designated 
as State Sponsors of Terrorism, Concept Release Nos. 8,860, 56,803, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,862, 65,863 (Nov. 23, 2007) 
(“The federal securities laws do not impose a specific disclosure requirement for business activities in or with a 
country based on its designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.”).  
 158. Amy Deen Westbrook, What’s in your Portfolio? U.S. Investors Are Unknowingly Financing State Spon-
sors of Terrorism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1151, 1180–85 (2010) (explaining that although current federal securities 
law and regulations do not impose a specific disclosure requirement that addresses business in or with state 
sponsors of terrorism, “[c]ertain general instructions in Regulations S-K suggest . . . that such information must 
be disclosed”). 
 159. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010) (addressing when a company must include a shareholder’s proposal in 
its proxy statement and when a proposal may be excluded). 
 160. See generally Securities Act Release No. 2887, Exchange Act Release No. 3,347, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 417, 1942 SEC LEXIS 44 (Dec. 18, 1942) (requiring that issuers include in their proxy materials 
shareholder proposals that are opposed by management, provided that issuers have been given adequate notice 
of such proposals). 
 161. 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8(i)(1)–(13) (2010) (enumerating the 13 bases for exclusion of proposal); see SEC 
Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14A, 2002 SEC No-Act LEXIS 638 (July 12, 2002) (“The rule [14a-8] generally requires 
the company to include the proposal unless the shareholder has not complied with the rule’s procedural re-
quirements or the proposal falls within one of the rule’s 13 substantive bases for exclusion.”). 
 162. Procedural requirements include demonstrating eligibility to submit a proposal, guidelines for submis-
sion, maximum length of proposal and deadline for submission. See generally 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8(b)–(e) 
(2010). 
 163. See id. §240.14a-8(b)–(d). 
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during the previous year, or if the date of the annual meeting has been changed by 
more than 30 days from the date of the previous year’s annual meeting).164   
A company that intends to rely on the rule to exclude a proposal must submit its 
no-action request 80 days in advance of the date that it proposes to file its definitive 
proxy materials.165  Under paragraph (i) of Rule 14a-8, a company may exclude a 
shareholder proposal from its proxy materials if the proposal falls into one of thir-
teen substantive bases for exclusion.166  Among other substantive restrictions, com-
panies may exclude proposals that violate the law, relate to ordinary business, con-
flict with or duplicate other proposals to be considered at the same meeting, or are 
moot.167  To exclude a proposal based on any of these enumerated bases for exclu-
sions, a company must first notify the SEC, which often is done through a no-action 
letter process whereby the SEC’s staff considers the merits of the issuer’s arguments 
for exclusion of the shareholder proposal.168 
Issuers often rely on Rule 14a-8(i)(7) to exclude a shareholder proposal based on 
the position that the proposal relates to the issuer’s ordinary business operations.169  
The SEC Staff has allowed, however, proposals to be included in proxy materials 
when the subject matter of the proposal relates to a significant policy issue that 
                                                                
 164. Id. § 240.14a-8(e)(2). 
 165. Id. § 240.14a-8(j) 
 166. Generally a company may exclude a proposal that  
(1) is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under applicable state law; (2) would, if im-
plemented, cause the company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject; (3) 
is contrary to any of the proxy rules, including Rule 14a-9; (4) relates to a personal claim or griev-
ance, is designed to result in a benefit to the shareholder, or furthers a personal interest; (5) relates 
to operations that account for less than five percent of the company’s total assets, net earnings and 
gross sales for its most recent fiscal year and is not otherwise significantly related to the company’s 
business; (6) the company would lack the power or authority to implement; (7) relates to the com-
pany’s ordinary business operations; (8) relates to a nomination or an election for membership on 
the company’s board of directors or a procedure for such nomination or election; (9) directly con-
flicts with one of the company’s proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting; 
(10) has already been substantially implemented by the company; (11) substantially duplicates 
another proposal previously submitted to the company by another shareholder that w ll be included 
in the company’s proxy materials for the same meeting; (12) deals with substantially the same sub-
ject matter as another proposal or proposals that has or have been previously included in the com-
pany’s proxy materials within the preceding five calendar years and the proposal did not garner spe-
cified levels of shareholder support; and (13) relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends.  
17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8(i) (2010). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. § 240.14a-8(f)–(g) (requiring that companies intended to exclude proposal must file submission 
with SEC and establishing that burden is on company to demonstrate entitlement to exclude proposal).  
 169. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7). 
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“transcends” ordinary business.170  As a result of the this position, the SEC Staff has, 
through the no-action letter process, determined that certain proposals could not 
be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) when the relate to a wide range of policy issues, 
thereby permitting the proposal and supporting statement to be included in an is-
suer’s definitive proxy statement and be subject to a shareholder vote.171  These pro-
posals have related to, among other things, environmental issues, human rights, po-
litical contributions, health care, sustainability, animal rights and anti-
discrimination.172  The types of policy-oriented proposals could be included in the 
proxy statement regardless of whether the policy or information regarding the poli-
cy is material to the issuer’s shareholders, and, in most cases, do not receive sub-
stantial support from shareholders voting on the proposals.173  In many ways, the 
exception from the ordinary business exclusion of Rule 14a-8 has created a platform 
for the disclosure of social and political policy issues (and the positions of the inter-
est groups advancing such proposals) that would otherwise be outside of the public 
reporting regime for most public issuers. 
VI. Conclusion 
The Specialized Corporate Disclosure requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act are a 
breed apart from the traditional disclosure requirements that the SEC administers 
under the US federal securities laws.174  The Specialized Corporate Disclosure provi-
                                                                
 170. See, e.g., Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40,018, Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 23,200, 1998 SEC LEXIS 1001, *20–21 (May 21, 1998) (stating that proposals 
which relate to ordinary business matters but focus on “sufficiently significant social policy issues . . . would not 
be considered to be excludable, because the proposals would transcend the day-to-day business matters . . .”). 
 171. See CF Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E, 2009 WL 4363205 (Oct. 27, 2009) (“Over the past decade, [the SEC 
has] received numerous no-action requests from companies seeking to exclude proposals relating to environ-
mental, financial or health risks . . . [but] [t]o the extent that a proposal and supporting statement have focused 
on a company minimizing or eliminating operations that may adversely affect the environment or the public’s 
health, we have not permitted companies to exclude these proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).”) 
 172. See, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a Vehicle for 
Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 365, 382–83 (2006) (surveying the 
use of the shareholder proposal mechanism to address issues of corporate social responsibility l ke racial dis-
crimination and pollution, more recently human-rights proposals and a study of economic impact of 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria); Thomas A. DeCapo, Challenging Objectionable Animal Treatment with 
the Shareholder Proxy Proposal Rule, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 119, 148–49 (illustrating that the shareholder proxy 
proposal rule is a “viable means for challenging objectionable animal treatment”). 
 173. See, e.g., DeCapo, supra note 175, at 146 (noting that determining who might benefit, or have an inter-
est in, a particular policy is difficult unless the company gives shareholders the opportunity to voice their opi-
nions on the issue vis-à-vis Rule 14a-8 shareholder proxy proposal mechanism); see also Stephen Gandel, Nuns 
vs. Bankers: The Shareholder Proxy Wars, TIME, Apr. 21, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/ 
0,8599,1981861,00.html  (noting that most proposals that do not receive management’s approval are voted 
down by shareholders). 
 174. See supra Parts II—IV.   
VOL. 6 NO. 2 2011 355 
sions continue a developing trend to utilize the SEC’s public reporting regime as a 
means for advancing specific policy interests, notwithstanding whether the man-
dated information is material to prospective investors and shareholders of public 
issuers.175 Before utilizing this approach in the future, Congress and the Administra-
tion should carefully evaluate how the Specialized Corporate Disclosure provisions 
have been implemented and whether they have achieved their intended effect with-
out being unduly burdensome on public issuers and their investors. 
 
 
                                                                
 175. See supra Part V.  
